• Green parties have driven the implementation of ambitious decarbonisation policies across Europe. However, in many places, their success has met with a backlash from rural and agricultural interests. 

• In response, policymakers are increasingly focusing on boosting green investment and jobs in green sectors, rather than setting out more disruptive plans to decarbonise existing activities.  

• Green issues are a priority for voters in northern Europe, but are seen as less important in southern and eastern Europe. Green policies are still being driven forward in these countries, but mostly through EU funds.  

As climate change has become a more significant issue, green parties have increased their representation in European parliaments, and are now represented in coalition governments in six EU member states. Where the electoral system disadvantages smaller, explicitly green parties, centre-left and liberal parties have increasingly included robust climate policies in their policy platforms. As they have achieved more mainstream success, most European green parties have become more pragmatic, particularly in countries with proportional electoral systems that allow them to enter parliament more easily. On policy, despite green parties often prioritising other environmentalist aims (such as blocking industrial development in rural areas, or the phasing-out of nuclear power) at the expense of slowing decarbonisation, overall, Green parties and movements in Europe have become a critical force in advancing ambitious climate legislation including the faster adoption of renewable energy, and adopting aggressive plans for refitting the transport, agricultural and buildings sectors. 

Green parties in power

Green parties have seen the most success in north and west European countries with proportional-representation electoral systems. In this region, green parties are in government in Germany, Austria, Ireland, Belgium and (pending the new government formation) Luxembourg. In all of these countries except Austria, the greens have spearheaded significant legislation, such as tougher overall decarbonisation targets, more stringent sectoral targets in Ireland and plans for the decarbonisation of the residential sector in Germany. However, all of these initiatives represented significant compromises with more conservative coalition partners—whether agricultural interests or fiscal conservatives—leaving the final legislation far short of what green advocates had hoped for. In Austria, reluctance from the senior coalition partner has resulted in an almost total lack of progress on green initiatives. 

A backlash in the making

In many of these countries, the scale of compromise needed has caused the green party base to become demoralised, resulting in a slide in the polls. This decline in popularity has been exacerbated as the costs of green policies receive more attention—often to the benefit of the far right. The voters most likely to become mobilised against green policies are rural and suburban constituents who are more dependent on driving; less affluent voters for whom higher electricity costs or the costs of replacing household appliances would be more burdensome; and less educated voters who are less engaged by climate as a voting issue, all of whom are demographically more likely to support far-right parties. Climate change is currently receding in the list of priorities for voters behind the economy and inflation. The backlash in many countries, including Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands (even though the governing parties are not explicitly green) has been concentrated among agricultural interests.

The Nordic region is where climate change commands the greatest public interest as a voting issue, and previous governments in Denmark, Sweden and Finland enacted stricter climate laws in 2020‑22. In all of these countries, the green parties have now been pushed into opposition, and governments have moved further to the right, with right-wing parties campaigning on cost-of-living issues. Still, although the incoming governments in these countries have pledged to slow down or pause new green initiatives, they have so far maintained the existing targets.

A new strategy: focus on investment and jobs

The first high-profile example of backlash against green policies was in France, where the “Gilets Jaunes” protests in 2018 (concentrated among rural voters reliant on cars) resulted in a proposed fuel tax being scrapped. The government has continued to pursue green policies, but has changed tactics. It has focused instead on new investment in renewable energy, and has been the most aggressive country in taking advantage of the European Commission’s relaxation of state aid rules for green subsidies, couching its plan as a jobs programme rather than explicitly a climate programme.

We expect the Labour Party in the UK to pivot in a similar way to green investment and jobs programmes as the focus of its agenda in advance of the 2024 election (which we expect it to win), in response to attempts by the Conservative Party, which has rolled back some of its own green targets, to frame the election around green issues. These efforts are similar to programmes in the US and other advanced economies to frame decarbonisation as a jobs issue and are likely to be adopted by other green and centre-left parties in Europe as they struggle to overcome hostility to any costs being imposed on consumers in service of the green transition. 

Transitions at the EU level

Elsewhere in Europe, progress has been more mixed. Southern Europe, particularly Spain and to a lesser extent Italy, has made significant progress in meeting decarbonisation targets, but the issue is relatively muted for voters. The Spanish government has occasionally attempted to link the summer’s severe weather to climate change, whereas the right-wing government in Italy has downplayed that link. Overall, concern about climate is correlated with education, per capita income and age (with younger voters more engaged on this issue), making southern and eastern Europe less favourable terrain for a large green movement. 

Eastern Europe sees little overt campaigning on climate change. However, governments are taking advantage of EU funds to promote popular green policies—the Polish government in particular is touting a high take-up of electric heat pumps, even as it resists a phasing-out of coal power. With climate change not a major voting issue, there is little political appetite for governments in the region to oppose established interests such as coal or farming, who represent highly mobilised groups of voters for whom the green transition will be costly. In countries such as the Baltic states, green parties primarily represent farming interests, and so are less likely to support aggressive decarbonisation efforts in those sectors.

Much of the political will and investment in green initiatives in these subregions is driven by the disbursement of EU structural funds, as well as funds from RePowerEU and the EU recovery fund, a large share of which are earmarked for accelerating the energy transition. Disbursement of these funds has been delayed owing to policy adjustments since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but is set to pick up in 2024. The relaxation of state aid rules as part of the Green Deal Industrial Plan has also seen limited take-up so far (except in France) owing to the lack of direct EU funds available, and stretched budgets of member states. As a result, the scope and scale of EU funds for the energy transition is likely to be a major issue in the next round of EU budget negotiations, as well as at the European Parliament elections in May 2024. We expect a strong showing from both green parties and right-wing parties that oppose green policies in these elections.

The analysis featured in this piece can be found in EIU’s Country Analysis service. This integrated solution provides unmatched global insights covering the political and economic outlook for nearly 200 countries, enabling organisations to identify prospective opportunities and potential risks.